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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:
A VEHICLE FOR COMPENSATING THE GOOD SAMARITAN
INTRODUCTION

On the morning of October 18, 1973, in crowded midtown Manhattan, an alleged junkie, with a long police record, turned crazed
gunman, killing two people and wounding two others.1 While many
onlookers fled in fear, several chased the gunman along 34th street
until he was shot and had stumbled into a subway entrance. One of
those pursuing the gunman was Calman Goldberg, a 50-year old salesman, who, at the time of the shooting, had been on his way to visit
clients.2 Mr. Goldberg was shot to death by the berserk gunman; he
left a wife and two sons.3 As a result of a suit brought by his widow,
a referee of the New York State Workmen's Compensation Board
ordered the employer's insurance company to pay death benefits to the
family of Mr. Goldberg. 4
During the course of four hearings before a referee, the employer's insurance company sought to show that Mr. Goldberg's actions were of a highly personal and voluntary nature, that Mr. Goldberg in so acting had exceeded the parameters of his work as a salesman, and that as a result his family was not entitled to payments
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of New York. 5 The referee's
decision granting payments simply declared that the carrier had failed
to show that the accident did not arise in the course of work.6 The
decision was not appealed.
This case was decided on the carrier's inability to overcome a
presumption that the injury sustained arose in the course of the employment of the deceased.7 Presumably the Goldberg family has received
1. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
2. Id., July 9, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
3. Id.

4. Id.
5. N.Y. WOR

IMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (McKinney 1965).

6. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1974, at 30, col. 1.
7. Under section 21 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, a claim, properly filed, falls within the
purview of the statute. The carrier in this case tried to introduce hearsay evidence
of the fact that Mr. Goldberg had participated in chasing and attempting to apprehend a man who had just shot someone on the street. This hearsay evidence consisted
of the testimony of a detective who had investigated the shooting and reported what
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monetary compensation for Mr. Goldberg's untimely death. However, the decision by referee Mary Egan has far greater significance
than is evident on its surface, for this award can be looked on as one
of the most innovative workmen's compensation awards to date.
The facts on which the Goldberg recovery was based suggest, and
the Board's award encourages, an expansion of workmen's compensation coverage to include an area previously left unattended: compensation for injuries suffered by a "Good Samaritan" acting spontaneously in an effort to apprehend a criminal. The case of Calman
Goldberg, as dealt with by the New York Workmen's Compensation
Board, opens the door for discussion of the role of the Good Samaritan in modem American society and of the recent developments in
the area of workmen's compensation. This Comment will examine
the plausibility and efficacy of using workmen's compensation as a
vehicle for compensating the Good Samaritan.

I. THE GOOD SAMARITAN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

TODAY

A. The Duty To Act
The appellation "Good Samaritan" originated in the teachings
of Jesus in a parable recorded in the Book of Luke,8 but the obligation of an individual to assist his neighbor is rooted in the mores and
ethics of virtually every civilized country. However, the approach to
a different aspect of this problem, whether one is legally obligated to
act, differs in various countries of the world.
In the United States, because of an ever-present "[r]eluctance to
countenance 'nonfeasance' as a basis of liability, the law has persistently refused to recognize the moral obligation of common dewitnesses told him. Also, the carrier attempted to produce an eyewitness, but this man
refused to attend the hearings. Having failed to produce an eyewitness, the carrier
offered a written statement which the witness had given to an investigator. This was
accepted, but the referee indicated that it would only be given the weight to which
it was entitled. The hearing concluded with a determination that the decedent sustained an accident arising in and out of the course of employment. Thus, there was no
determination of the "Good Samaritan" issue. The referee simply found that the carrier could not meet the burden of showing this accident did not arise out of the
course of employment. Interview with Albert M. Aronowitz, attorney for Mr. Goldberg's widow, in New York City, Oct. 9, 1974.
8. Luke 10:30-:37.
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cency and common humanity, to come to the aid of another human
being [whose life] is in danger.. .

."9

The only aid which imperilled

Americans enjoy is motivated by a "higher" law, the voice of conscience. Conscience, in the long run, has proven an inadequate inducement to act as a Good Samaritan and an even more inadequate means
of compensating the maimed or killed Samaritan. °
In contrast to the indifference of Anglo-Saxon law, as typified by
the laws of the United States, 13 European countries, as of the end
of the 1950's, had specific provisions in their criminal codes stipulating a duty to rescue.. Although these provisions differ as to when
the duty to rescue arises, who is bound to render assistance, and what
one is obligated to do in a particular situation, they each in some
way refute the Anglo-American, common-law view that the Good
Samaritan, an altruist who renders service to another without request
and for unselfish motives, is a mere volunteer. 12
The essential issue that distinguishes the American from the
European response is willingness to legislate morality. The question
of legislating morality is deeply philosophical and controversial. While
the topic has often been discussed among legal scholars in this country, 13 the task of enacting laws requiring people to act in emergencies
14
is one that American legislatures have not generally undertaken.
9. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 340 (4th ed. 1971).
10. See id. at 341.
11. Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW

91-92 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).

12. See Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life, in THE GooD SAMARI-

63 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
13. One such discussion produced many of the essays that have been, and will be,
referred to in this Comment. The essays were originally presented as papers for the conference on "The Good Samaritan and the Bad," held at the University of Chicago on
April 9, 1965, and have been published in one volume, THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE
LAW (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
14. To encourage doctors and others to render assistance to people in distress,
several states have passed so-called "Good Samaritan" statutes. These laws, in essence,
confer on the doctors who undertake such assistance immunity from liability for any
suit that might be brought against them. For discussion of these statutes, see 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1301 (1964). See also Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue, 25 STAN. L. REv.
51 (1972). Vermont is the only state in the United States at this moment which imposes on all persons a general duty to rescue. The type of duty introduced by the Vermont statute is commonplace in Europe but unique in American law. A portion of the
statute reads as follows:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril
to himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give
TAN AND THE LAW
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Consequently, Good Samaritan acts that do occur in our society are
usually of a totally voluntary nature, induced only by the spontaneous
and natural reactions of thoughtful, courageous, sympathetic individuals. 15 This raises another extremely important question: "Even
though we may not compel you to assist your fellow citizen ... , if
your sense of human identity with your fellow citizen, of brotherhood, is such that you do assist him and suffer substantial loss thereby,
[shall we] as a community, share that loss with you?""'
B. Compensation for the "Good Samaritan"
Of more immediate concern than the much debated issue of
whether one has a duty to undertake a Good Samaritan act is the
question of whether remuneration should be available to those individuals who perform such actions and are injured or killed in the
process. It is, of course, impossible to measure the positive effect such
compensation would have on encouraging future samaritan acts, but
knowledge that financial assistance is available to one injured in attempting to aid another might induce this favorable action.1 7 Similarly, awareness that no assistance is available might dissuade one
from offering assistance. Enacting statutes to compensate those injured while performing "good deeds" would symbolize society's concern for those who take the risk of getting personally involved and
helping their fellow man.' 8 It would, furthermore, fulfill a duty,
reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is
being provided by others.

(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be
fined not more than $100.00.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (Supp. 1971).
15. In some cases there exists a special relation between the parties that affords a
justification for the creation of a duty. "Thus a carrier has been required to take reasonable affirmative steps to aid a passenger in peril, and an innkeeper to aid his guest.
Maritime law has long recognized the duty of a ship to save its seaman who has fallen
overboard; and there is now quite a general tendency to extend the same duty to an
employer when his employee is injured or endangered in the course of employment."
W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 56, at 343 (footnotes omitted).
16. Morris, Compensation and the Good Samaritan,in THE GOOD SAmARITAN AND
THE LAW 136 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
17. Holland, The Good Samaritan Laws, 16 J. PuE. L. 128, 137 (1967).
18. An excellent example is the use of Frank Walker, a 28-year old father of
six, who died a hero's death when he attempted to subdue a deranged prisoner who had
disarmed and shot his police guard in an escape attempt from St. Vincent's Hospital in
New York City. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1975, at 1, col. 4. About a year earlier, Mr.
Walker's wife had died in an automobile accident that disabled Mr. Walker and left
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because "one department of the law's service to society [is] its moral
service, which it performs by encouraging with the appropriate technical remedies whatever is morally approved and discouraging what
is condemned."' 19 There are, currently, several means by which injured
Good Samaritans can be compensated. The concern of this Comment
is that the remedies available insufficiently deal with the gamut of
Good Samaritan injuries that may be incurred, and that they fall far
short of providing the "moral service" of encouraging Good Samaritan
behavior.
The phrase "Good Samaritan act" is rather amorphous, encompassing a host of possible fact situations in which one may offer aid
to a fellow human being in peril. These situations include, among
other acts: assisting police in the capture of a criminal, assisting a
potential victim of a crime, rescuing a person in a situation imminently dangerous to life or limb, or simply coming to the aid of one
suddenly taken by illness or accident.
Proceeding on the idealistic premises that society, through its
laws, should seek to compensate Good Samaritans who are victims
of crimes of personal violence as well as those who are injured in
situations where no crime takes place, and that society should also
encourage its citizens to act in either situation, the following section
analyzes the current state of American law as it relates to the Good
Samaritan. There exist two main avenues by which an injured samaritan or the dependents of a killed samaritan may look for compensation.
1. Civil Negligence Action. The samaritan can look to the civil
him with the sole responsibility of caring for his six children. After Mr. Walker's heroic
death, thousands of sympathy notes and cards, accompanied by a total of more than
$17,000 in checks and dollar bills, poured into the office of the Patrolman's Benevolent Association and the Association for a Better New York. One girl wrote: "The
pain, loneliness and uncertainty you all feel now will eventually sift away because of all
the prayers of New Yorkers like myself who pray for all of you to overcome this tragedy.
Remember your father died a hero." Id. Feb. 4, 1975, at 36, col. 2. By February 7th,
two trust funds had been set up to safeguard the money being contributed to the six
children, which by that time had reached $50,000 and was steadily increasing. Id. Feb.
7, 1975, at 36, col. 4. Donations had poured in from all over the country, and doctors

and dentists called, offering their professional services to the children as well. Clearly,
these contributions exemplified the appreciation and concern that existed at the time
for the brave act of Mr. Walker and the well-being of his children. It is these actions
which symbolize society's interest in those who take the risk of getting personally involved and helping their fellow man.
19. Honore, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE GooD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW
233 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
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arena for redress. There he will have to satisfy, depending on the
jurisdiction's common law, either the requirements of a "danger invites rescue" or of a "forseeability" formula in order to recover for
his injuries.
The "danger invites rescue" doctrine, utilized in several jurisdictions, "has been applied most frequently when a defendant through
his negligence either injured or imperilled another and a third person
was injured in attempting to rescue the person in jeopardy." 20 The
doctrine has also been utilized when a person negligently placed himself in danger or attempted suicide so as to invite rescue. Under this
theory some jurisdictions hold that there is an independent duty of
care that is owed to the samaritan and if a person acts as a rescuer
and consequently injures himself, the person rescued, or even a
stranger, the original wrongdoer must bear the liability.21 Many other
courts and writers rely on "forseeability" as the ground for liability,22
ruling that unless the rescue is of a foreseeable nature, no liability
will attach to the wrongdoer.
Having accepted the proposition that "enabling rescuers to recover damage they suffer in rescuing people negligently endangered
[either by a third party or by their own negligence] is the least the
legal system can do," 23 there are two grave and easily discernible
drawbacks to both the "danger invites rescue" and "foreseeability"
modes of awarding compensation. The first is that they do not cover
what is possibly the most prevalent situation in which the Good
Samaritan acts-that where the victim has been endangered by circumstances not involving any individual's fault which arise purely by
accident. For samaritans acting and injured in such situations there
is no compensation via the civil process. Secondly, compensation in
20. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 463, 255 N.E.2d 173,
174, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 944 (1969). The most famous case in this area is Wagner v.
International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921), in which Judge Cardozo stated:
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does
not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences.
It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the
natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled
victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.
Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437. See also Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d
958, 966 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 44, at 277 (footnotes omitted).
22. Honore, supra note 19, at 235.
23. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in
THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAw 32 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
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these, as in all negligence cases, is totally dependent upon the ability
of the negligent party to pay for his actions. If the individual at
fault can compensate, it is fair in these circumstances that he should.
However, a society which values "Good Samaritanship" cannot rely
on the present recovery mechanism alone. The existing system works
justice for only a small proportion of Good Samaritans. Other sources
must be made available to compensate those who cannot be made
whole via traditional "negligence" avenues and to whom our
society owes, for the courage they have demonstrated and example they
have set, a great debt.
2. Statutory Compensation of Crime Victims. One newly developed vehicle for compensating Good Samaritans is the statute
mandating compensation of victims of crime. The impetus for such
legislation came from analysts who had concluded that the incidence
of crime was large enough, and yet sporadic enough, to justify that
losses caused and expenses incurred by it, should be distributed
24
throughout society rather than borne by the individual victims.

Since the formulation of the idea of compensating the victims of
crime in the United States, at least nine states25 have adopted laws
establishing such systems. There are two theories upon which the
enactment of these statutes has been based and, consequently, two
varieties of crime-reparation statutes. One is formulated on the "of
right" principle, providing compensation to all who have been injured by criminal acts regardless of financial considerations. The other
is based on social policy, making financial hardship the prime requisite
26
to recovery.
California, in 1965, was the first state to adopt a statutory compensation scheme and its law recognizes both the "of right" and "fi24. "Since crime is endemic, and since it is chance in many instances which defines who shall be the victim of crime, and a combination of chance and high moral
qualities which define who shall be the injured Good Samaritan, it is surely proper
that the society which is so organized that crime is endemic should share in the
financial aspects of the loss to the Good Samaritan." Morris, supra note 16, at 137.
25. Among those state statutes mandating compensation for victims of crime are:
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 13960-66 (West Supp. 1971); HAwAII REv. STAT. ch. 351
1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 71 (et seq.) (Supp. 1974); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch.
258A, §§1-6 (Supp. 1974); MD.ANN. CODE art. 26A (Supp. 1974); NEv. Rav. STAT.
ch. 217 (et seq.) (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 52:4B-1 (et seq.) (Supp. 1974); N.Y.
ExEc. LAw §§ 620-35 (McKinney Supp. 1971); WAsH. RE v. CODE §§ 7.68.010-.910
(Supp. 1973).
26. See Note, Compensation for the Criminally Injured Revisited, 47 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 88, 103 (1971).
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nancial hardship" theories of compensation. The second article of
California's present plan is the successor to sections 13600 through
13603 of the Penal Code. This statute is a "Good Samaritan" statute
and operates on a theory of indemnification for actual losses, with
financial need not being a prerequisite to recovery.27 Under article
1 of the statute, which deals only with residents who as the direct result of a crime suffer pecuniary loss, financial need is a requirement. 2
The State of New York was the second state to establish a program for compensating the victims of crime. 29 In New York, the statutory program implements a financial hardship policy. Awards are not
granted unless the claimant would suffer serious financial hardship
as a result of the loss of earnings or support and the out-of-pocket
expenses incurred as a result of injury.2 0
Although avenues for compensating the intervening Good Samaritan who is injured or killed as a result of a crime exist,2 ' state schemes
27. The Good Samaritan statute is entitled "Direct Action of Citizens as Benefiting Public; Indemnification in Certain Cases."
Direct action on the part of private citizens in preventing the commission of
crimes against the person or property of others, or in apprehending criminals,
or rescuing a person in immediate danger of injury or death as a result of
fire, drowning or other catastrophe, benefits the entire public. In recognition of the public purposes served, the state may indemnify such citizens, their
widows, their surviving children ...in appropriate cases for any injury, death,
or damage sustained by such citizens.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13970 (West 1969).

28. Id. § 13964.
29. See N.Y. EXEc,LAw § 620 (McKinney 1966).
30. Id. § 631(6). The New York law "makes awards to innocent victims of
crime who otherwise meet the requirements of the Statute, as well as to the Good
Samaritan who is also the innocent victim of a crime." SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 12 (1972). The
City of New York, since 1965, has had its own program for compensating victims of
crime. See CITY OF NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 93d-4.0 (1965). The
New York City ordinance speaks to claims for injuries:
1. Which shall have been caused by a police officer of the city, while such
officer is engaged in arresting or endeavoring to arrest any person or in
retaking any person who has escaped from legal custody, or in executing
any legal process, or
2. Which shall have been caused by any person who is engaged in or who
is in the act of leaving the scene of the commission of a felony or who
is endeavoring to escape from a police officer or from legal custody, if
such death was caused or injury received in assisting a police officer in
the performance of his duties.
In situations where the Good Samaritan victim may be eligible under the city's law,
he must file a claim and the state board will defer any determinations on the issue
until the city board has taken action. SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supraat 12.
31. The Washington scheme displays a policy to encourage intervenors. This
policy "is reflected in the definition of [the term] 'victim,' which includes persons who
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for compensating victims of crime are few, have been slow in developing, and fall short of providing comprehensive reparation for the full
gamut of Good Samaritan action which results in injury. The existing
state programs are severely limited in that they apply only where
crime is involved, and, in many situations, compensation is further
restricted to cases in which financial hardship exists. The great majority of states have not instituted any compensation program. Clearly,
there remain a large number of samaritans who are not covered by
a state program for compensating victims of crime, by a Good Samaritan statute applicable to non-criminal situations, or by the closely circumscribed civil remedies generally available. This author suggests that
an answer to the dilemma faced by some of those samaritans who, at
this point in the evolution of Good Samaritan compensation law,
have no legal redress for their injuries exists in the form of a highlyevolved workmen's compensation scheme. "During the forty years of
active compensation systems in the United States this field has grown
into one of the most important branches of the administration of
justice. '3 2 It is with an eye toward the expansion and liberalization
of workmen's compensation that the plausibility and necessity of using
that system to compensate injured Good Samaritans who may fall
under its purview is here advocated. The following section considers
the role played by workmen's compensation in American society, notes
the vast changes that have taken place in its doctrinal justifications
and types of injuries being compensated, and attempts to demonstrate
that workmen's compensation is an appropriate vehicle for compensating the Good Samaritan injured during the course of employment.
II.

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-THE METAMORPHOSIS

A. HistoricalPerspective
Workmen's Compensation is the oldest and unfortunately most litigious branch of modem social insurance. Its growth and gradual
transformations are an illustrative example of how political, social and
economic forces have redefined the functions of government in modem society.33
sustain injury in a 'good faith and reasonable effort to prevent a criminal act' or in
a 'good faith effort to apprehend a person reasonably suspected of engaging in a criminal act.'" Cosway, Crime Compensation, 49 WASH. L. REv. 551, 554 (1974).

32. S. RIESENFELD & R.
33. Id. at 127.

MAXWELL,

MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION

136 (1950).
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Workmen's compensation originated as a protection for the working class of Europe against hazards brought about by the 19th century's rapid industrial development. Germany was the forerunner in
the European development of industrial accident insurance. In order
to offset the tremendous political gains of the Social Democrats, whose
progTams closely adhered to the socialist philosophy, the German government initiated a comprehensive system of social insurance. From
this, the Accident Insurance Act of 1884, as well as numerous other
social accident insurance laws, 34 was born. In England, the first Work-

men's Compensation Act was passed in 1897, 31 and the repercussions
of these developments were soon to be felt in the United States.
The year 1909 was the turning point, marking the beginning of a
strong push for workmen's compensation legislation in America. In
that year Montana established a state compensation insurance fund
for the coal mining industry36 and the legislatures of New York,8
Wisconsin,s and Minnesota30 9 established commissions to study the
possibility of developing some form of workmen's compensation. By
the end of 1921 all but a few of the American states had enacted
such legislation; most others followed suit soon thereafter and in 1963
40
Hawaii completed the web of state compensation legislation.
B. The Changing Theory
Workmen's compensation has undergone rapid changes in the 65
years since its acceptance in the United States, 41 changes which reflect
34. For a brief discussion of the historical development of workmen's compensation

in Europe, see id. at 128-29.
35. See id. at 128.

36. An Act to Create an Accident and Disability Fund for Coal Miners, ch. 67,
[1909] Laws of Montana 81-86.
37. An Act to Establish Inquiry into Employer's Liability, ch. 518, [1909] Laws of
New York 1310-11.
38. An Act Relating to the Committees of the Legislature Appointed to Investigate
Industrial Insurance, ch. 518, [1909] Laws of Wisc. 664-67.
39. An Act to Create Minnesota Employees Compensation Commission, ch. 286,
[1909] Laws of Minn. 338-39.
40. HAw aiREv.STAT. ch. 386 (1963).

41. "Since itsinception though, workmen's compensation [has been] a mechanism
for providing cash wage benefits and medical care to victims of work-connected injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the consumer, through the
medium of insurance, whose premiums are passed on in the cost of the product."
Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206
(1952).
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the dramatic growth of American society as a whole. No longer do
Americans reside in a rural, small-town setting but rather they live
in a well-developed, urbanized society. Many thousands more workers
are covered under workmen's compensation now than were dreamed
of at its inception. The life styles of working people have undergone
similar changes.
The ten hour day and the seven day week have been superseded by

the eight hour day and the five day week. Paid holidays and vacations further reduce the part of life preempted by work. As a result,
the individual workers exposure to work-related risks has declined
while exposure to non-work related risks has expanded enormously.'

Workmen's compensation has undergone doctrinal changes to accommodate the above-mentioned phenomena; these doctrinal developments
warrant our attention.
1. The Demise of the Fault Concept. Nineteenth-century industrial growth brought with it numerous new hazards for the growing
working class; employees received more pay for the higher risks that
attached with industrialization, but personal injury laws were, at that
time, heavily weighted in favor of employers. When a worker was
injured he had to prove employer-negligence in order to recover;
negligent acts of fellow employees were not attributable to the employer. Furthermore, negligence on the employee's part which contributed to his injury barred recovery. Workmen's compensation plans
undertook to eradicate these inequities which had been magnified by
new industrial hazards and "[t]he three wicked sisters of the common
law-contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule-were abolished as defenses. '43 Fault and negligence were
abandoned and legislators turned their attention to the plight of the
injured employee and his need for compensation. Thus, a totally
new system developed:
[A] unique system which is neither a branch of tort law nor social
insurance of the British or continental type ....Like tort, but unlike
social insurance, its operative mechanism is unilateral employer liability, with no contribution by the employee or the state; like social
insurance but unlike tort, the right to benefits.., are based on a social
42. Bernstein, The Need for Reconsidering the Role of Workmen's Compensation,
119 U. PA. L.REv. 992, 995 (1971).
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 9,§ 80, at 531.
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theory of providing support and preventing destitution, rather than
44
settling accounts between two individuals according to ... blame.

2. Molding Yesterday's Legislation to Today's Needs. With the
demise of the fault concept, theoretical attention focused on the social
and economic policies behind the workmen's compensation laws. It
is this area of the law that has caused the most discussion among legal
scholars in the past two decades.
Professor Larson has pointed out that "[t]he ultimate social
philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of
providing, in the most efficient, most dignified and most certain form,
financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries .

.

.

.

45 The economic philosophy expressed in the famous

slogan, "the cost of the product should bear the blood of the working man,"4 6 is that through workmen's compensation the cost of the
employee's injuries should be absorbed, ultimately, by the consumer.
The vast majority of American workers are now covered by workmen's compensation; they and their dependents are relying on this
system to solidify their basic economic security in case the worker should
47
suffer disabling injury or death in the course of his employment.
The full protection of American workers from injury or death requires a prompt, fair and substantial system of workmen's compensation. It is the importance of expeditious and fully satisfactory compensation which has prompted the development, refinement and expansion of workmen's compensation.
There is no doubt that workmen's compensation boards and the
courts are limited by the confines of state legislation, 4 but their decisions are eventually formulated by a careful weighing of the social
and economic policies that have been discussed above. The significant changes in the structure of the average working man's life style,
discussed earlier, and the fact that injuries now occur in situations
not contemplated during the early development of workmen's com44. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORXMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.20 (1972).

45. Id. § 2.20.
46. S. RESENFELD & R.

MAXWELL,

supra note 32, at 138 (footnote omitted).

47. In order to qualify for state workmen's compensation payments the injury
received must occur in the course of employment. For an example of the use of this
phrase in the statutory material itself, see N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 10
(McKinney 1965).
48. The many boards and courts that make such compensation awards are restricted by the stautory language that is found in the individual state statutes.
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pensation programs, or by writers of the various statutes, have forced
compensation boards and courts to adjust and expand the extent of
coverage they are willing to recognize under the new and potentially
far-reaching compensation legislation. Seeking to implement the
broad social policy of workmen's compensation and to realize its great
potential for beneficial and humanitarian purposes, the appropriate
bodies have had to expand the definition of work-related injury, an
injury "arising out of and in the course of employment," as the typical
workmen's compensation statute puts it. The erosion of this requirement has shifted the focal point of a board's inquiry from an attempt
to determine the causal connection between the employee's actual
work and his injury, to an assessment of the effect the disabling injury has not only on the employee but on society as well.
III.

THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE REQUIREMENT OF WoRK-RELATION

A. The Development and Use of the Positional Risk Doctrine
It is quite clear that the most advanced extension of the boundaries which originally circumscribed protection accorded injured
workers by workmen's compensation has resulted from the interpretation of the commonly recited formula, "arising out of and in the
course of" employment. 49 The interpretation of this phrase, through
65 years of litigation, has brought us today's greatly expanded scope
of state workmen's compensation laws coverage. The history of the
phrase and its interpretation in the many jurisdictions of the United
States will not be analyzed here. 50 It will suffice to describe the most
expansive interpretation of the phrase which courts have accepted
and to explain how this liberal interpretation, based as it is upon
the social and economic policies discussed earlier, can be used to provide financial and medical benefits for Good Samaritan workers injured due to their natural and socially desirable impulses to go to
the aid of a human being in peril.
49. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 44, at § 5.20. Forty-two states and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-41, 944-50
(1970), have adopted the entire British Compensation Act formula: injury "arising out
of and in the course of employment."
50. For a fine discussion of the difficulty of applying this phrase, see Bohlen, A
Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REv. 328

(1912).
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The traditional prerequisites to recovery under state workmen's
compensation laws, that the injury be received in an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," has two functional requirements: "arising out of . . . employment" refers to the causal

connection between the accident and the employment, 5 1 and "in the
course of employment" refers to elements of place and time.52 More
specifically, one must show that the injured employee had been in
a place authorized by his employer and undertaking work related to
his employment when the injury occurred. Originally, it was strictly
required that each of these tests be met independently before compensation was awarded. In recent years increased breadth has been
given the two requirements by permitting interaction of the concepts.
The result has been an acceptance in many jurisdictions of a "workconnection" hybrid which results from merging the concepts "arising out of" and "in the course of." Application of the hybrid is justified by reasoning that:
[I]n practice, the "course of employment" and "arising out of employment" tests are not, and should not be, applied entirely independently; they are both parts of a single test of work-connection,
and therefore deficiencies in the strength of one 5factor are sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in the other. 3
The "work-connection" concept permits the inference that compensation will be awarded if the injury appears to be reasonably related
to the injured's employment. 54
Along with the "work-connection" test a doctrine has developed
which Professor Larson denominates the "positional-risk" doctrine."5
This doctrine is best stated as follows: "An injury 'arises out of' the
employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the
conditions or obligations of the employment placed claimant in the
position where he was injured by a neutral force, meaning by 'neutral' neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with
51. See Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation, 51 N.O.L.
Rav. 705, 717 (1973).
52. Id.

53. 1 A. L~AssoN, supranote 44, at § 29.10.
54. Henderson, Should Workmen's Compensation Be Extended to Non-Occupational Injuries?, 48 TExAs L. REv. 117, 122 (1969).
55. Larson, The Positional-Risk Doctrine in Workmen's Compensation, 1973

DuxE L.J. 761.
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the employment." 56 The earliest statement of the positional-risk
principle was in the Colorado case of Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Industrial CommissionST in which a farmhand was struck by lightning while returning from a neighbor's farm where his employer had
sent him to work for the day. The court furnished the rule that "when
one in the course of his employment is reasonably required to be at
a particular place at a particular time and there meets with an accident, although one which any other person then and there present
would have met with irrespective of his employment, that accident
58
is 'arising out of' the employment of the person so injured.1
"Positional-risk" has not, as yet, been accorded majority-rule
status in this country, although it has been adopted, in variegated
form, in 13 jurisdictions.5 9 The areas in which the doctrine has been
61
60
applied include injury due to stray bullets, lunatic assault cases,
insect bites, 2 wasp stings, 68 unexplained assaults64 and others. It is
to the existing and potential treatment of Good Samaritans under
this doctrine that we now turn our attention.
Understandably, because the "arising out of" and "in the course
of" language appears almost verbatim in every workmen's compensation statute, as an employee's activities become more remotely connected with his work, compensation boards and courts become more
reluctant to compensate for injuries sustained. The genre of activity
on which this Comment focuses, voluntary acts of Good Samaritan
employees, is one that at this time is considered to be on the peri56. Id.
57. 81 Colo. 233, 254P. 995 (1927).
58. Id. at 236, 254 P. at 996 (Burke, C.J., concurring).
59. See Larson, supranote 55, at 815.
60. E.g., Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d
805, 214 P.2d 41 (1950); Williams v. United States Cas. Co., 145 So. 2d 592 (La.
App. 1962); Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957); Christiansen v.
Hill Reprod. Co., 262 App. Div. 379, 29 N.Y.S.2d 24 (3d Dep't 1941), aft'd, 287 N.Y.
690, 39 N.E.2d 300 (1942).
61. E.g., Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir.
1936); Louie v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Hampton, 414 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
62. E.g., Webster v. Mason, 13 App. Div. 2d 355, 217 N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dep't
1961); Richmond v. Mass & Birzt, 275 App. Div. 879, 88 N.Y.S.2d 682 (3d Dep't
1949).
63. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 378 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
64. See Mayo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969);
Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Co., 427 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); B & B Nursing
Home v. Blair, 496 P.2d 795 (Okla. 1972); Fox v. Carpenters Local 606, 33 App. Div.
2d 605, 304 N.Y.S.2d 464 (3d Dep't 1969).
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phery of compensable work-connected claims. The genre has been discussed by some scholars under a jargonistic label, "rescue cases"; 5
as was mentioned earlier, however, Good Samaritan acts involve not
only rescue type situations but any situation in which unsolicited and
legally unrequired aid or comfort is offered.
It is now accepted that efforts to rescue co-employees, or other
persons to whom the employer might have some duty, arise out of
and in the course of employment. 6 Also, recovery has been allowed
for injuries sustained when the character of the emergency was peculiarly associated with the character of the employment. 67 It is important to note, however, that regardless of whether an act was beneficial to the employer, or whether it was forseeable and necessary
due to the nature of the employment, these cases all predicate recovery on establishment of some type of work-connection. The "positional-risk" doctrine, if applied, would remove this barrier completely.
Requiring only that employment bring the employee to the position
from which he was moved to act, the "positional-risk" doctrine would
allow complete compensation for all Good Samaritan actions by the
working man.
The Supreme Court's decision in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific
Maxon6 s is a landmark opinion with regard to "positional-risk" doctrine and compensation of the Good Samaritan. O'Leary involved the
65. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 44, at §§ 28.00-.24.
66. See Larson, supra note 55, at 808.
67. E.g., Transport Co. v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 210 Ark. 862, 198 S.W.2d 175
(1947). In the Arkansas Fuel case, a petroleum-products truck salesman employed by a
fuel company was injured while assisting a stalled oil transport. The court held that
where the person rendering assistance serves an interest of his employer by relieving
the emergency condition, he has not departed from the service of his employer and the
employer is not relieved of liability. In Oklahoma Ry. v. Cannon, 198 Okla. 65, 176 P.2d
482 (1946), a bus driver sustained an injury when assisting a stalled motorist blocking
his route. The court held that if the act being performed at the time of the accident
was reasonably incidental to the work which the employee was performing, it may be
said to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. In Puttkammer v. Industrial Comm'n, 371 Il1. 497, 21 N.E.2d 575 (1939), a coal-truck driver, upon completing a delivery and returning to the coal yard, came upon an injured child at the
scene of an accident and was injured while carrying the child from the auto collision.
The court allowed recovery. In this particular situation there was no benefit to the
employer, but the rescue opportunity was thrown in claimant's path by distinctive conditions of his employment. In Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E.
726 (1928), a taxi-cab driver was pressed into service by a police officer pursuing a
criminal. The cab driver was injured in this endeavor. The court found the danger of
such pursuit to be incident to the management of taxis.
68. 182 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1950), rez'd, 340 U.S. 504 (1951).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Act,69 which authorizes compensation for accidental injury or death arising out of and in the
course of employment. The decedent in O'Leary was an employee of
a government contractor on the island of Guam. While waiting for
a bus to take him from a recreation center near the shoreline, decedent heard cries for help and plunged into a channel to effect a
rescue. In his attempt to reach the men in trouble he drowned. Awarding compensation, the Court used the following analysis:
[Nor is it necessary that the employee be engaged at the time of the
injury in activity of benefit to his employer. All that is required is
that the "obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone
70
of special danger" out of which the injury arose.
Two later cases emphasize the "positional-risk" analysis employed in
O'Leary. In Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry Commission7' a towerman working for the Louisiana Forestry Commission noticed a child
being attacked by a large dog approximately 20 feet from his tower's
base. While rushing down the tower stairway to rescue the child from
the dog, plaintiff suffered a severe strain that resulted in a hernia.
The Supreme Court, in awarding damages to the plaintiff, noted with
approval that human beings are so composed as to want to try to
help fellow human beings whom they discover in perilous situations,
and it relied upon a previous federal court decision which noted that:
[E]xpressions of human nature are incidents inseparable from [one's
job]. They involve risks of injury and these risks are inherent in
the working environment. No more is necessary than that the work
subject the employee to a peril which comes from the fact that he is
72
required to be in the place where it strikes when it does so.
The second case following these principles is Reilly v. Weber Engineering Co.7 3 The decedent therein, a captain in the city fire
department, while investigating an emergency, observed a young boy
dangling by one foot from a high tension wire. The captain fell and
was killed while attempting to rescue the boy. The New Jersey court
69. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-41, 944-50 (1970).

70. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 507 (1951).
71. 221 La. 818, 60 So. 2d 449 (1952).
72. Id. at 826, 60 So. 2d at 451, quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 689 (1940).
73. 107 N.J. Super. 254, 258 A.2d 36 (1969).
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cited O'Leary and found liabilty on a "positional-risk" theory 1 4 In
both of these cases the employment of the victims placed them into
contact with a situation in which it was probable that they, as human
beings, would make a rescue attempt-but for the conditions of their
employment this demand upon their reactions would never have taken
place.
The law of workmen's compensation has arrived at a crossroad.
Because of societal changes discussed earlier 75 and erosion of the requirement of work-connectedness, there has been a shift in the law's
emphasis from an employer-oriented requirement of strict causal connection between injury and'employment to an employee-oriented effort to realize an objective of the underlying social policy behind
workmen's compensation programs-provision of economic security
and medical care for society at large.
Since it is increasingly difficult to maintain the distinction between
occupational and non-occupational injuries and because other programs-which do not attempt to apply such an amorphous testhave been developed to provide economic security and medical care,
one can hardly help question the need or desire, for this distinction .... 76

This author suggests that the Good Samaritan and his actions, in light
of the changes that have taken place in the field of workmen's com-

pensation, should be recognized by boards and courts throughout the
country; tribunals passing on facts of a Good Samaritan flavor should
have no qualms about increasing the class of compensable victims
and awarding damages for acts of this nature, which are demonstrably
beneficial to society. The adoption of the "positional-risk" doctrine or,
74. See Reilly v. Weber Eng'r Co., 107 N.J. Super. 254, 260, 258 A.2d 36, 39-40
(1969). Contra, Murphy v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 299 So. 2d 3 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1974),
involving a floating sales manager trainee of an insurance company, who was injured
when, at the request of a truck driver, he attempted to assist in preventing a truck
from rolling down an incline. The first body before which the petitioner in Murphy
appeared (the JIG) found that the "positional-risk" doctrine was applicable, in that his
employment had brought petitioner to the place where he observed the occasion for
rescue attempts. The Industrial Relations Commission rejected application of "positional-risk" theory. Petitioner appealed, citing O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific Maxon. The
court took a restrictive view of the "positional-risk" doctrine and upheld the Commission's decision, stating that the injuries were not reasonably foreseeable consequences of
the trainee's employment.
75. See text accompanying footnotes 41-42 supra.
76. Henderson, supra note 54, at 119.
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at the very least, its utilization in Good Samaritan situations, increases
to a virtual certainty the odds that courts will award compensation to
the injured workmen-Good Samaritan or his dependents.
One weighty argument posed in response to this suggestion is that
such actions cannot be undertaken without extending compensation
beyond the bounds of the economic policy which provides the foundation of the legislation. This argument points out that if the consumer
ultimately absorbs the cost of workmen's compensation, it is essential
to make certain that accidents not resulting from engagement in the
production process, or not made more likely by that process, are not
compensated. 7 These objections can be countered by citing first, the
fact that such Good Samaritan actions are not common place in
American society. Since, as was mentioned earlier, there is no duty
placed on the individual in our society to come to the aid of a fellow
citizen, such acts are few and far between. Secondly, whatever the extra
cost "Good Samaritan" compensation will involve, the social desirability of Good Samaritan acts far outweighs the increase in cost to the
consumer.
Were the compensation boards and courts to accept the idea of
compensating the Good Samaritan via workmen's compensation, the
United States would be one step closer to the ideal of assuring all
Good Samaritans that their actions will be compensated if injury or
death results therefrom. "America is . . . approaching the point of

decision.., in regard to the future of workmen's compensation in the
United States and what role, if any, it should play in an era that increasingly emphasizes social insurance in an attempt to maintain economic security and medical care.1 78 Not only would compensation of

"working" Good Samaritans promote the strong social policy behind
workmens' compensation, but it would, without question, be a proper
moral step to take in this country where morality is oftentimes the
forgotten child.
CONCLUSION

In a modem industrial society, such as the one in which we live,
praise and encouragement should be offered to individuals who help
77. See Malone, supra note 51, at 705.
78. Henderson, supra note 54, at 118.
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others in peril. The law, through its mechanisms for compensation, has
the ability to authoritatively project an attitude of praise and encouragement. The law of workmen's compensation represents in some
degree our recognition that we are, collectively, responsible for the
health and well being of the entire community. It has the capacity to
shoulder a greater degree of responsibility through its potential for
compensating the worker injured when acting as a Good Samaritan.
This Comment places in the limelight those forgotten individuals
whose actions society should gratefully accept, who are particularly
deserving of praise and admiration since this country places no duty
on its members to undertake such actions. It shows that oftentimes
individuals who selflessly risk their own safety to aid others are left
uncompensated for injuries they may sustain. Finally, it directs attention to a field of law that has undergone many changes since its
inception; one which has great potential for compensating some, as
yet unattended, injured Good Samaritans, for possibly encouraging
future desirable actions of a similar nature, and for planting the suggestion that American society is indebted to Good Samaritans as a class.
A strong individualist mentality has pervaded this country for
many years. The desire not to get involved and the instinct to mind
one's own business can be regarded as the main reason for non-action
on the part of most individuals. 79 Let the case of Calman Goldberg
provide an example for all Americans, and let it be the impetus for
statutory changes and juristic constructions which would, by recognition of acting Good Samaritans, bring us one step closer to a true
brotherhood of man.
JEFFREY L. TANENBAUM
79. Gregory, supranote 23, at 31.

